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1 Introduction
The impact of cross-border shopping should be taken into consideration
when setting tax rates. Cross-border shopping is costly from a nation’s
perspective because resources are lost through tax leakage. This will af-
fect the maximizing tax rate wether the objective of the government is tax
revenue- or welfare maximization. In addition, cross-border shopping opens
up for strategic interaction among countries with respect to the tax rates,
i.e., commodity tax competition. The outcomes of such games are defined
as the equilibrium tax rates.
Cross-border shopping is widespread in the Scandinavian countries, e.g.
with spirits.1 High price diﬀerentials create large incentives for crossing the
border. In recent years there has been a growing public debate in all the
Scandinavian countries related to certain cross-border exposed goods. As a
result, we have observed some cases of tax cut on spirits.2 The justification
has been related to cross-border shopping. In light of this, it brings to
mind the question: To what extent are the actual tax rates on spirits in
the Scandinavian countries consistent with the notion that the governments
are taking into account cross-border shopping and tax competition? To try
answering this question an empirically based simulation model is constructed
and calibrated, with the purpose of finding equilibrium tax rates on spirits
for the Scandinavian countries.
For each of the three countries we consider a representative consumer
consuming two goods: Spirits and an aggregate good termed ’other goods’
consisting of all other goods and services, i.e., we consider a complete de-
mand system. Spirits is exposed to cross-border shopping and is purchased
at home or abroad. We assume that the governments want to maximize
utility, taking into account that there exists some negative externality as-
sociated with consumption of spirits. The purchase of registered and cross-
border shopped spirits is included in the utility function as two diﬀerent
goods acting as substitutes for each other. They generate diﬀerent utility
because of costs buried in the utility function. One possible interpretation
of this modelling strategy is that it focuses on non-pecuniary transportation
costs, i.e., physical and psychological stress associated with cross-border
shopping3. An advantage of this kind of modelling is that we can use stan-
dard consumer theory, with all its properties applying.
Two types of games are considered. As a point of departure we make the
1The focus on spirits is motivated by the fact that for Norway this is among the goods
with the highest cross-border shopping measured as share of total consumption. The
same is valid for the other countries. Moreover, it is a harmfull externality generating
good potensially exposed to a very high tax rate compared to other goods, including other
alcoholic beverages and tobacco (see e.g. Aasness and Nygård, 2009; NOU 2003:17).
2Significant cuts in 2003 for Denmark and 2002 for Norway.
3See Aasness and Nygård (2009) for another application of this kind of modelling.
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assumption that the countries participate in a simultaneous game, which is
the most common assumption made in the literature. In addition, we make
the assumption that the countries participate in a sequential game, in which
Denmark set their tax rate in first period, influenced by the continental
policy, followed by Sweden, and finally Norway. Rigidities in the political
systems may cause countries to act in such a sequential way, e.g. uncertainty
about how other countries may act can make countries adopt a ’wait-and-
see’ strategy. This could induce a domino eﬀect that starts with the policy
at the Continent, and then spread through rest of Scandinavia. In addition,
if the outcome of the sequential game benefits all the participating countries
compared to the simultaneous, it becomes even more interesting to consider
because the former will Pareto-dominate the latter. Then the simultaneous
game equilibrium does not seem reasonable. 4
There exists a significant theoretical literature on commodity tax com-
petition. A seminal paper is Mintz and Tulkens (1986), another important
one is Kanbur and Keen (1993). Several other contributions exists such as
Edwards and Keen (1996), Wildasin (1988), Lockwood (1993, 2001), Lock-
wood et al. (1994), Nielsen (2001), Oshawa (1999), Haufler and Schjelderup
(2004), and Wang (1999). Common to these papers are the use of game the-
ory and their preoccupation with characterizing diﬀerent equilibria.5 Turn-
ing to the empirical studies there are less contributions, but Rork (2003),
Nelson (2002) and Devereux et al. (2007) are some examples. Common to
these are the aim of estimating reaction function. Another common feature
is that theory is not explicitly present when it comes to their empirical mod-
elling. Theory is used only to shed some light over the empirical estimation.
In the present paper a framework based on consumer theory and suitable for
analyzing tax competition in the Scandinavian countries is presented, and
an empirical model based explicitly on this theory is constructed. By pro-
viding a close link between the theory and the empirical model, we ensure
that our empirical results are consistent with theory.
The simulations show that we are able to find equilibria. These indicate
that large diﬀerences in price on spirits in Scandinavia may appear also
4The literatur has been dominated by the assumption of simultaneous games, without
much problematization. Only few examples of the contrary can be given, such as Wang
(1999). In the presentation ’And the tax winner is... Endogeneizing leadership in com-
modity taxation race’ at the 65th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance
(IIPF), professor Rota-Graziosi showed that a sequential game could be the outcome of
a two-stage game where the timing decision was taken in the first periode. His work was
influenced by van Damme and Hurkens (1996, 2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006),
which considered this within the context of Industrial Organization. In our context, if all
countries could gain from playing a sequential game compared to a simultaneous, the si-
multaneous game (Nash) equilibrium would not constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a game in which the order of moves was determined in a pre-play stage.
5For papers adressing the impact of cross-border shopping on welfare optimal tax rates,
but not within a game theoretical framework, see e.g. Christiansen (1994) and Scharf
(1999).
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within a tax competition context. The price diﬀerential between Norway
and Sweden are even larger than in the base year 2004, suggesting that
price diﬀerences in Scandinavia on spirits could increase as well as decrease
in future. The tax rates in 2004 are, for each country, higher than the
equilibrium tax rates. On the other hand, compared to a closed economy
situation, the tax rates in 2004 are lower, although only slightly for Sweden.
We show that this suggests that Norway and Denmark to a larger extent
are taking into account cross-border shopping and tax competition when
setting the tax rates. Furthermore, the results are rather insensitive with
respect to the type of game, i.e., simultaneous or sequential. This is due to
the fact that the utility maximizing tax rates are rather robust with respect
to other countries’ tax rates. Nevertheless, we end up with somewhat higher
tax rates and prices in the sequential game and also a higher utility for every
country.
The paper starts out by presenting the theoretical framework. Section
3 turns to the empirical model, describing the specification and the proce-
dure of calibration. In Section 4 simulation results are presented. Finally
concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 A consumer model with implicit transportation costs
In the model set up Norwegian consumers are cross-border shopping in Swe-
den, Denmark and other countries (e.g. Finland). Swedish consumers are
cross-border shopping in Denmark and other countries (e.g. Germany),
while Danish consumers only are cross-border shopping in other countries
(e.g. Germany). This set up implies that the direction of cross-border shop-
ping will be determined by our theoretical framework, which is based on the
current situation. Consequently the model must be used carefully because
we can end up with unreasonable equilibria.6 Nevertheless, it will be suit-
able for finding equilibria where the direction of cross border shopping is the
same as in the base year. The model consists of a representative consumer
for each country, i.e. Norway, Sweden and Denmark. For Norway the utility
of the representative consumer is given by
UN(SNR , S
N
S , S
N
D , S
N
O , C
N), (1)
where SNR is the registered purchase of spirits in Norway by Norwegians,
SNS , S
N
D and S
N
O are Norwegians cross-border shopping in Sweden, Denmark
and all other countries, respectively. CN is the aggregate consumption of
6A country could end up with the lowest price (e.g. Norway), but still have outward
cross-border shopping while no inward cross-border shopping.
5
all other goods and services. The consumer is supposed to maximize (1)
subject to the budget constraint
pNRS
N
R + p
N
S S
N
S + p
N
DS
N
D + p
N
OS
N
O + p
N
CC
N = Y N , (2)
where pNR is the price of registered spirit consumption in Norway, and p
N
S , p
N
D
and pNO are the prices facing Norwegians on spirits in Sweden, Denmark and
other countries respectively. pNC is the price of the aggregate good and Y
N
is the total expenditure of Norwegians. From this we can derive Marshallian
demand functions
SNi

pNR , p
N
S , p
N
D , p
N
O , p
N
C , Y
N

for i = R,S,D,O (3)
CN(pNR , p
N
S , p
N
D , p
N
O , p
N
C , Y
N) (4)
i.e., consumption of spirits from diﬀerent sources and consumption of the
aggregate good as function of all prices and total expenditure. In the same
way, for Sweden the utility of the representative consumer is given by
US(SSR, S
S
D, S
S
O, C
S), (5)
which is maximized subject to the budget constraint
pSRS
S
R + p
S
DS
S
D + p
S
OS
S
O + p
S
CC
S = Y S , (6)
and hence we derive demand functions for Sweden
SSi

pSR, p
S
D, p
S
O,p
S
C

for i = R,D,O (7)
CS(pSR, p
S
D, p
S
O, p
S
C). (8)
Finally, for Denmark we have the representative utility
UD(SDR , S
D
O , C
D), (9)
which is maximized subject to the budget constraint
pDRS
D
R + p
D
OS
D
O + p
D
CC
D = Y D, (10)
yielding the demand functions for Denmark
SDi

pDR , p
D
O , p
D
C , Y
D

for i = R,O (11)
CD(pDR , p
D
O , p
D
C , Y
D). (12)
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2.2 Governments’ objective: utility maximization
Let tN , tS and tD be the tax on spirits in Norway, Sweden and Denmark,
respectively. The relationship between the tax rate, the consumer price and
the pre-tax price is
pjR = q
j + tj for j = N,S,D, (13)
where qj is the (constant) pre-tax price of registered purchase of spirits in
country j. We assume that the governments want to maximize the utility of
the representative consumer, taking into account that there exists some ex-
ternal eﬀects associated with consumption of spirits.7 We start with finding
the first best solution for this problem. If we take as a point of departure
Sweden, we have
max
S,C
US(SSR, S
S
D, S
S
O, C
S)− αS

SSR + S
S
D + S
S
O

(14)
s.t. pSRS
S
R + p
S
DS
S
D + p
S
OS
S
O + p
S
CC
S = yS + TS (15)
SSRt
S
R +C
StSC − TS = R
S −RSCB (16)
where tSC is the tax on the aggregate good, R
S
is the revenue requirements,
RSCB is the tax revenue collected from inward cross-border shopping (e.g.
from Norwegians), and TS is a lump sum transfer (or tax). αS is associated
with the external eﬀect of spirits consumption. Substituting for TS in (15)
give us one constraint
yS −

qSRS
S
R + p
S
DS
S
D + p
S
OS
S
O + q
S
CC
S

= R
S −RSCB, (17)
where qSR and q
S
C is the producer price of spirits and the aggregate good,
respectively. Maximizing (14) subject to (17) gives the first order conditions
∂US
∂CS = −λq
S
C , (18)
∂US
∂SSR
− αS = −λqSR , (19)
and
∂US
∂SSi
− αSi = −λpSi for i = D,O, (20)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
7Tax revenue maximization is often used in the commodity tax competition literature.
Simulation results with the governments having this as an objective is left for the appendix,
see A.2.
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With α = 0 the first best solution will be a uniform tax structure. If we
assume α < 0 the first best solution would be to set an extra tax on spirits
equal to -α/λ, i.e., fully internalize the external cost. First best requires that
we can freely set the tax rate on all goods, including ’other goods’ and those
purchased abroad through cross-border shopping. Cross-border shopping is
not taxable and we assume that the tax rate on ’other goods’ is fixed. This
implies that we end up in a second best world in which the government
uses the tax on spirits to correct for the externalities, along with adjusting
the transfers to satisfy the revenue constraint. To study the second best
problem we formulate the maximization problem for Sweden as
max
pSR,T
S
V S(pSR, p
S
D, p
S
O, p
S
C , y
S + TS)− αS

SSR + S
S
D + S
S
O

(21)
s.t.
SSRt
S
R + S
S
Ct
S
C − TS = RS −RSCB, (22)
giving the following first order conditions
∂V S
∂pSR
− αS
∂SSR
∂pSR
+
∂SSD
∂pSR
+
∂SSO
∂pSR

(23)
−λ

SSR + t
S
R
∂SSR
∂pSR
+ tSC
∂SSC
∂pSR
+
∂RSCB
∂pSR

= 0,
∂V S
∂TS − α
S
∂SSR
∂TS +
∂SSD
∂TS +
∂SSO
∂TS

(24)
−λ

tSR
∂SSR
∂TS + t
S
C
∂SSC
∂TS − 1

= 0.
By using Roy’s identity in (24), substituting for ∂V S/∂pSR in (23), and using
the Slutsky equation these two first order conditions can be formulated as
tSR
∂ eSSR
∂tSR
+ tNC
∂ eSSR
∂tSC
=
−αS
λ
%
∂ eSSR
∂tSR
+
∂ eSSD
∂tSR
+
∂ eSSO
∂tSR
+
&
− ∂R
S
CB
∂pSR
(25)
where the hat indicates that we look at compensated demand. The left-
hand side of the equation is known from optimal tax theory first derived
by Ramsey. It is the change in compensated demand of registered spirits
following a small intensification in tax on spirits and ’other goods’. The
right hand side reflects the externality eﬀect. In the special case of α = 0
and ∂RSCB/∂pSR = 0 , the right-hand side reduces to zero. Then we should
set the tSR such that in optimum a small intensification of the indirect tax
system will not change the compensated demand for SSR. Further (25) can
be rewritten as
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tSR
pSR
= −α
S
λ

∂ eSSR
∂tSR
+
∂ eSSD
∂tSR
+
∂ eSSO
∂tSR

∂ eSSR
∂tSR
pSR
− t
S
C
pSC
ElpSC
eSSR
ElpSR
eSSR
−
∂RSCB
∂tSR
∂ eSSR
∂tSR
pSR
(26)
By using Euler’s theorem and the homogeneity of degree one of the expen-
diture function, we get
tSR
pSR
=
tSC
pSC
⎡
⎢⎣
ElpDR
eSSR +
pSCBS
S
CB
pSRS
S
R
ElpSR
eSSCB
ElpDR
eSSR
⎤
⎥⎦ (27)
−α
S
λ
1
pSR
⎡
⎢⎣
ElpSR
eSSR +
SSCB
SSR
ElpSR
eSSCB
ElpSR
eSSR
⎤
⎥⎦−
∂RSCB
∂tSR
∂ eSSR
∂tSR
pSR
,
where
pSCBS
S
CB
pSRS
S
R
ElpSR
eSSCB = ElpNR
eSND
pNDS
N
D
pNRS
N
R
+ElpNR
eSNO
pNOS
N
O
pNRS
N
R
,
SSCB
SSR
ElpSR
eSSCB = ElpSR
eSSD
SSD
SSR
+ElpSR
eSSO
SSO
SSR
.
Note that the expression within the brackets in the first term of ex-
pression (27) will always be less or equal to one if we assume that the
substitution between registered spirits and cross-border shopped spirits is
zero or positive, i.e., ElpSR
eSSCB ≥ 0. Under the assumption of αS = 0 and
∂RSCB/∂pSR = 0, this implies that tSR/pSR ≤ tSC/pSC , i.e. the optimal tax rate
on spirits as share of consumer price, is always equal or below that of the ag-
gregate good. When it is equal, i.e., under zero substitution to cross-border
shopping, we have an uniform structure as in the first best. When cross-
border shopping is prevalent we should deviate from the uniform structure
and not tax spirits according to first best. Outward cross-border shopping
is costly for the society and this must be balanced against the desire for
minimizing the distortion between spirits and the aggregate good. If αS > 0
we have negative externalities which impacts the optimal tax rate. With no
substitution to cross-border shopping we should tax according to first best,
i.e., putting an extra tax on spirits equal to marginal external cost, -αS/λ.
Whenever we have substitution to cross-border shopping, the formula will
diﬀer from a first best situation. In the presence of substitution to cross-
border shopping we will not set the externality correcting tax rate as high
as -αS/λ, i.e. we will not fully internalize the external cost. Outward cross-
border shopping is costly and this must be traded oﬀ against the desire for
internalizing.
If ∂RSCB/∂pSR 9= 0 then eﬀects on the inward cross-border shopping must
also be taken into consideration. With ∂RSCB/∂pSR < 0 the tax revenue
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collected from inward cross-border will tend to decrease the tax rate, and
vice versa. Note that in this case we will not observe a uniform structure even
if αS = 0 and with the assumption of no outward cross-border shopping.8
For Norway and Denmark the same optimization apply with only modest
diﬀerences. Besides having more or less consumptions variables, the main
diﬀerence is that Norway does not have any inward cross-border shopping.
Game theory Equation (27), and the corresponding conditions from the
maximization for Norway and Denmark, implicitly define a reaction function
for each country, i.e., the utility maximizing tax rate on spirits as a function
of other countries’ tax rate. If we write the utility as a function of tax rates
only, namely hV j(tN , tS , tD) for j = N,S,D, the equilibrium tax rates for
the simultaneous game solves the equation
∂jV N
∂tN =
∂iV S
∂tS =
∂jV D
∂tD = 0, (28)
and for the sequential game we have
max
tN
jV N(tN , tS, tD), (29)
i.e., Norway maximizes the utility taking Swedish and Danish tax rate as
given. The solution to this problem gives the reaction function for Norway,
i.e., the optimal Norwegian tax rate as a function of Swedish and Danish tax
rates, namely tN (tS , tD). Sweden maximizes utility subject to the reaction
function of Norway, taking the Danish tax rate as given, hence
max
tS
iV S(tN , tS , tD) (30)
s.t. tN(tS , tD).
The solution to this problem implicitly give us the Swedish optimal tax rate
as a function of the Danish tax rate set in the first period of the game,
i.e. tS

tD

. Denmark maximizes utility subject to this and the reaction
function for Norway
max
tD
jV D(tN , tS , tD) (31)
s.t. tN

tS , tD

and tS(tD).
The optimal Danish tax rate in equilibrium is given by the solution to this
problem, and can be written as
∂jV D
∂tD +
%
∂jV D
∂tN
∂tN
∂tS
∂tS
∂tD +
∂tN
∂tD

+
∂jV D
∂tS
∂tS
∂tD
&
= 0 (32)
.
8Recall that we are not able to freely choose the tax rate on ’other goods’, as first best
requires.
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3 Simulation model
Based on the framework above a simulation model is constructed and cal-
ibrated. This section outlines the model specification and comments upon
the calibration procedure.
3.1 Specification of preferences
The utility of the representative consumer for Norway, UN , is specified as a
two-level LES (see Aasness and Holtsmark, 1993), i.e.
UN = BN(uN − γNa )β
N
a (cN − γNc )β
N
c (33)
uN = BNs (S
N
R − γNR )β
N
R (SNS − γNS )β
N
S

SND − γND
βND SNO − γNO
βNO ,(34)
where γNa and γNc are minimum consumption of total spirits and of the
aggregate good respectively (i.e. minimum consumption at the top level)
and γNR , γNS , γND , γNO are the minimum consumption associated with total
spirits consumption from diﬀerent sources (i.e. minimum consumption at
the bottom-level). The β−parameters are assumed to sum to one at each
level and can then be interpreted as marginal budget shares, i.e., βNa and
βNc is the marginal budget share of total spirit and of the aggregate good
respectively, βNc , βNc and βNc are the marginal budgets shares (of total spirit
consumption) of the spirits from diﬀerent sources.
Since the above specification implies separability assumptions, we can
represent the utility in terms of a utility tree. 9 The logic of the repre-
sentative consumers decision problem can be illustrated by considering an
increase in tax on registered spirits or on spirits purchased abroad. First
the consumer will consider changing his composition with respect to where
to purchase spirits. Then he will consider whether to change his total spirits
consumption, i.e., the composition of spirits and the aggregate good. Fi-
nally he will run down the utility tree checking whether the consumption is
optimally allocated.
The utility specification for Sweden and Denmark are exactly the same.
Only note that in equations corresponding to (34) we will have fewer con-
sumption variables.
3.2 Calibration procedure
The calibration procedure is developed in Aasness (1993).10 Let the utility
function have a vector Φ of unknown parameters. It can be shown that these
9For a general discussion of utility trees, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, ch.5) . For
an application, see Aasness and Nygård (2009).
10This method is greatly influenced by Frisch (1959).
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unknown parameters can be identified from a set of characteristics of the
demand function at one point . In other words a function f exist
Φ = f(p, S, E , C, Y,σT ,σS), (35)
where the arguments in the function are the characteristics, i.e., p is a
vector containing all prices, S is a vector containing spirits consumption from
diﬀerent sources, E is a vector containing Engel elasticities for all goods, C
is the consumption of the aggregate good, Y is the total expenditure, and
finally σT and σS are two substitution parameters (minus the inverse of
the flexibility of the marginal utility of money, cf. Frisch (1959)) associated
with the top level and the bottom level respectively. Note that this method
makes it possible to exploit information from various sources (both micro
and macro data) in a consistent way.
National account data from 2004 give us total expenditure, consumption
of registered spirits and the aggregate good measured in their respective
currency. I convert to Norwegian kroner, such that every consumption vari-
able is measured in Norwegian 2004-kroner.11 Several sources have been
used to make rough estimates on the amount of cross-border shopping in
the diﬀerent countries in 2004.12
For Norway we use the Engel elasticities for registered spirits from the
governmental report on excise taxes and cross-border shopping (NOU 2003:17).13
For Sweden I use as a source the work of Asplund et al. (2007). For Den-
mark I have not succeeded in finding a relevant estimate. When setting
the value on this parameter I have taken into consideration the estimates of
Norway and Sweden, in addition to the meta analysis of Gallet (2007). The
Engel elasticities along with the budget shares in the base year are given in
the tables 1-6, first two rows. Note that we use the same Engel elasticity
on cross-border shopped spirits as that of the registered spirits. When we
know the budget shares and all but one Engel elasticity, the last will follow
from consumer theory, i.e., that of ’other goods’.
Finally the two substitution parameters are set on the background of a
sensitivity analysis of the price elasticities it generates. We have in principle
two degrees of freedom and can chose the value of two price elasticities.
As shortly will be clear, we focus on two types of own price elasticities of
spirits when calibrating the substitution parameters. When the model is
calibrated the data fits the demand curves exactly, i.e., for the prices and
11Note that when measuring consumption in kroner, we actually do not need information
about prices to derive the demand functions.
12For Denmark and Sweden these includes Rapport om Grænsehandel, 2004 and data
collected by the Swedish SoRAD. For Norway the sources inlude data collected by the
Swedish Systembolaget and the Norwegian SIRUS, and corresponds to the data on cross-
border shopping used in the model KONSUM-G in Statistics Norway.
13Additional sourches could be Alver (2004) and Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2007).
They are all roughly in line with this.
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total expenditure in the base year 2004, the model generates consumption
patterns exactly fitting the data we use.
The tables 1-6 present matrixes of Cournot price elasticities generated
by our calibrated model at the base year prices and total expenditure, where
we have two diﬀerent levels of aggregation. The tables 2, 4 and 6 is based
on an aggregation of spirits, such that we end up with a 2x2 matrix. The
tables 1,3 and 5 is the disaggregated one, namely a 5x5 matrix for Norway,
a 4x4 matrix for Sweden and a 3x3 matrix for Denmark.14
Let us consider the tables 2, 4 and 6. We observe that the own price
elasticity for total spirit demand is -0.94 for Norway, implying that a 1 per-
cent increase in prices both at home and abroad will decrease total demand
by 0.94 percent. This is in line with the elasticity used in NOU 2003:17,
although slightly higher in absolute value. Almost the same value prevail
for the corresponding elasticity for the two other countries, but spirits in
Sweden is assumed to be somewhat less price sensitive than in Norway. Fi-
nally, spirit demand in Denmark is assumed to be even less price sensitive.
Some support for this can be found in NOU 2003:17.15
Next turn to the tables 1, 3 and 5. The own price elasticity of registered
spirits with respect to domestic price is significantly higher in absolute value
compared to the corresponding total own price elasticities in the tables 2, 4,
and 6. This reflects the fact that the representative consumer can substitute
to cross-border shopping when the domestic price increases. The own price
elasticity for registered spirits in Norway is -1.18. This is lower than in the
NOU 2003:17 (-1.41), but more in line with the value used in the model
KONSUM-G for 2007.16 For Sweden the corresponding price elasticity is
-1.31, which is in line with Asplund et al. (2007) (-1.29).17 Finally the
corresponding Danish elasticity is -1.42. In a report from 2007 calculations
imply an assumption of the the corresponding price elasticity around -1.5
(Grænshandelsrapport 2007 ). Note that the diﬀerentials between the two
price elasticities are by far largest for Denmark, then followed by Sweden
and finally Norway. This can be interpreted as Denmark being more exposed
to cross-border shopping than the other countries. When considering the
14By assuming that the prices within a group move in the same proportions, we can by
exploiting Hicks composite commodity theorem aggregate all the goods within a certain
group and threat this as one commodity. Consequently, note that the column sums in
the tables are zero. These are weighted sums of the elasticities which follows from the
consumers budget constraint. In the same way all the row sums are zero in prices and
total expenditure. This is a consequence of the fact that all the demand function are
homogenous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure. In practice, this can be very
usefull to for instance avoid programming faults.
15Actually, since there exits large price diﬀerential between the countries with respect
to spirits, it seems natural to think of the good as being a more luxory good in the high
price country. In other words letting the Engel - and price elasticity tending to increase
when prices increases.
16KONSUM-G is a consumer model at Statistics Norway.
17 In addition, see SOU 2004:86, pp. 220-221, for a discussion.
13
geography and the distance to the German border for the Danish citizens,
this seems defendable. Furthermore, both Sweden and Norway have high
population density near the border. But, the possibility of cross-border
shopping is more restricted in Norway than in Sweden through quotas. It
seems possible that this could restrain the eﬀect of a price change somewhat.
Even when the demand functions are calibrated it still remains some
calibration of parameters before we can proceed with simulation tasks. We
must have knowledge about the tax rates in 2004 to calibrate producer prices
in the base year. We also need information about the consumer prices on
spirits to determine wether the equilibria are reasonable. Tax rates and
prices on spirits is found in WHO (Global Status Report on Alcohol, 2004).18
In addition we must have the tax rate on the aggregate good. This is set to
be equal to the general VAT level in the country. This is of course a rough
estimate, but the VAT constitute the major source of indirect taxation in
general. Some goods are taxed more heavily and some more leniently, but
it seems reasonable that this roughly average out.
Furthermore we need to have some opinion about the external costs
of alcohol consumption. The value of this parameter is set on the bases of
Gjelsvik (2004) (for Norway), Jar et al.(2002) (for Sweden) and the report of
’Sunnhetsministeriet’ (1999) (for Denmark). These studies give an estimate
on the total costs of alcohol consumption in the three countries. We are
focused on spirits. How much spirits contributes to total costs is determined
by how much of the total consumption of pure alcohol spirits contributes
to. Thereby implicitly assuming that one liter of pure alcohol is equally
damaging across diﬀerent types of beverages.
Table 1.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E), budgets shares (w), and tax rates (t/q) for Norway - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chn ej.03casn ej.03cadn ej.03can ej.ogn sum
c03chn Spirits; Norway 0,603 1,569 2,204 -1,183 0,139 0,076 0,025 -0,627 0,000
c03casn Spirits; cross-border shopping Sweden 0,036 1,569 0,000 1,267 -2,311 0,076 0,025 -0,627 0,000
c03cadn Spirits; cross-border shopping Denmark 0,012 1,569 0,000 1,267 0,139 -2,374 0,025 -0,627 0,000
c03can Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,066 1,569 0,000 1,267 0,139 0,076 -2,425 -0,627 0,000
cogn Other goods and services 99,282 0,996 0,240 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,995 0,000
sum (weighted) 100 % 1,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 2.  Price elasticities for Norway - main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cn ej.ogn ej.sum
c03cn Spirits -0,942 -0,627 0,000
cogn Other goods and services 0,000 -0,995 0,000
sum (weighted) 0,000 0,000
18The data are from 2002. For Sweden the tax rate did not change significantly from
2002 to 2004. Norway have lowered their tax rate some, and the Danish tax rate was
substansially decreased in late 2003. The data have been adjusted for these facts.
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Table 3.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E) and budgets shares (w) for Sweden - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chs ej.03cads ej.03cas ej.ogs sum
c03chs Spirits; Sweden 0,536 1,409 2,799 -1,310 0,365 0,098 -0,562 0,000
c03cads Spirits; cross-border shopping Denmark 0,059 1,409 0,000 0,890 -1,835 0,098 -0,562 0,000
c03cas Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,220 1,409 0,000 0,890 0,365 -2,102 -0,562 0,000
cogs Other goods and services 99,185 0,997 0,250 -0,001 0,000 0,000 -0,995 0,000
sum (weighted) 100 % 1,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 4.  Price elasticities for Sweden in - main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cs ej.ogs ej.sum
c03cs Spirits -0,847 -0,562 0,000
cogs Other goods and services -0,001 -0,995 0,000
sum (weighted) 0,000 0,000
Table 5.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E) and budgets shares (w)  - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chd ej.03cad ej.ogd sum
c03chd Spirits; Denmark 0,414 1,110 0,738 -1,418 0,639 -0,332 0,000
c03cad Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,116 1,110 0,000 2,282 -3,061 -0,332 0,000
cogd Other goods and services 99,470 0,999 0,250 -0,001 0,000 -0,998 0,000
sum (weighted) 100 1,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 6.  Price elasticities for Danmark - main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cd ej.ogd ej.sum
c03cd Spirits -0,77862 -0,33183 0,000
cogd Other goods and services -0,00118 -0,99822 0,000
sum (weighted) 0,000 0,000
4 Simulation results
Simulations show that the utility first increases monotonically with the tax
on spirits, and then, after reaching a maximum, decreases monotonically
with the tax rate. Table 7 and 8 show that there exists equilibria, and
report the results for both types of games.
Three factors influence the magnitude of the equilibrium tax rates un-
der utility maximization: i) own- and cross price elasticities associated with
registered and cross-border purchased spirits, ii) the amount of cross-border
shopping (both inward and outward), and iii) marginal external cost and
the magnitude of the producer price. High amount of cross-border shopping
/high own price- and cross price elasticity tends to pull the tax rate down-
wards. High marginal external cost per liter pure alcohol and low producer
prices pull the tax rate upward.19 We see that the ordering of the tax rate
levels is the same for all equilibria, with Norway having the highest tax
rate followed by Sweden and Denmark. This ordering is consistent with the
ordering of the marginal external cost. The low tax rate in Denmark can
also be explained by the significant amount of cross-border shopping, com-
bined with the high own price- and cross- price elasticities. Sweden have a
somewhat lower own price- and cross price elasticity, but a significant higher
19A low pre-tax price here implies a higher tax rate because the tax rate is measured
as share of the pre-tax price.
15
cross-border shopping. Combined with a higher marginal cost and a lower
pre-tax price, the result is a higher tax rate compared with Denmark. The
Norwegian tax rate is highest, explained by several eﬀects: High marginal
external cost and low price elasticities combined with a smaller amount of
cross-border shopping. Note that compared to the 2004 situation, the Nor-
wegian tax rate is now higher than the Swedish tax rate.20
Compared to the situation in 2004, the equilibria imply a significant price
decrease for all three countries. And, from Table 9 we see that compared to
a situation where every country maximizes as if the economies are closed,
the diﬀerences in tax rate and price are huge.21 If ignoring the presence of
cross-border shopping among the countries, the Norwegian price will roughly
be around 80% higher, the Swedish around 86% higher and the Danish
around 76% higher, compared to a situation where they take cross-border
shopping into account. The loss in utility of ignoring the presence of cross-
border shopping, correspond to about 1,5-2 billions Norwegian kroner for
each country.
Note that the equilibrium prices in tables 7 and 8 imply that we will have
substantial cross-border shopping between the countries. In fact compared
to the situation in the base year 2004, the price diﬀerential, and thereby
cross-border shopping, between Norway and Sweden is larger. Compared
to the situation where the countries ignore the cross-border shopping when
maximizing, the increase in price diﬀerential is even larger. On the other
side, the price diﬀerential between Norway and Denmark will decrease.
Tables 7 and 8 show that we get higher tax rates and higher utility levels
for each country in the sequential game. This means that in this case the
simultaneous game equilibrium is Pareto- dominated by the sequential game
equilibrium. Furthermore, the equilibrium tax rates change somewhat in the
tables, although not much. This suggests that the maximizing tax rate in
each country is rather insensitive with respect to the two other countries tax
rate. Simulations of reaction curves confirms this.
We should be aware of that when speaking of the implications of cross-
border shopping it consists of two components. Firstly, for a given vector
of foreign prices, cross-border shopping will reduce tax rates compared to
a closed economy. This is simply because of the fact that cross-border
shopping involves real costs, and we are facing a trade-oﬀ. It is the non-
competition component. Secondly comes the component of tax competition,
i.e., strategic interaction. Consequently in our case, where it turns out that
20 In 2004 the tax rate as share of pre-tax price is higher in Sweden because of a lower
pre-tax price. Probably explained by the fact that Sweden have a state monopoly, as
Norway, but a larger market, making it possible to import large quantas at significantly
lower prices.
21Recall that with no cross-border shopping, the countries set their tax rate equal to
marginal external costs.
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the maximizing tax rates are nearly insensitive to changes in foreign tax
rates and prices, it will mainly be the non-competition component that
determines the tax rates in each country.
From Table 9 we see that in a closed economy the three countries will end
up with diﬀerent taxes and price levels. Especially Denmark will set a low
tax. This suggests that some of the explanation of the large tax and price
diﬀerences in the Scandinavian countries are the diﬀerences in estimates on
the external eﬀects of alcohol consumption, together with diﬀerent pre-tax
prices. The same structure will prevail if the countries take into account
cross-border shopping. But, the introduction of cross-border shopping and
its implications will alter the picture somewhat, making the price diﬀerential
between Norway and Sweden somewhat larger, but lowering the price dif-
ferentials between Sweden/Denmark and Norway/Denmark. On the other
hand, it seems like taking cross-border shopping into account will lower the
tax rates and price levels substantially for all countries.
For Norway and Denmark the actual tax rate are significantly lower
than the closed economy tax rate, but for Sweden only slightly. In general,
if we observe that each country’s tax rate is fare away from the equilibrium
tax rate, this could be interpreted as either one or more countries do not
take into account cross-border shopping and tax competition according to
our framework. Without further analyses, we cannot conclude that non of
the countries take cross-border shopping and tax competition into account.
This is due to the fact that if countries observe in the sequential game that
a country has not played the equilibrium tax rate, then they will also want
to deviate. Further, if a country in a simultaneous game is not fully aware
of the implications of cross-border shopping, and the other countries are
aware of this, then they will take this into account and not be playing the
equilibrium tax rates. In our case we know that what we referred to as the
tax competition component does not matter much, i.e., the maximizing tax
rates are fairly robust to changes in other countries’ tax rates. This means
that if a country significantly deviate from playing the equilibrium tax rate,
it does not take cross-border shopping into account according to our frame-
work. Our results can then be interpreted as follows: All countries have
started to take cross-border shopping into account when setting their tax
rates, but for Sweden this is only to a very small extent. In this context it is
interesting to note that both Norway and Denmark have had significant cuts
in their tax rates the recent years, mainly justified by the large cross-border
shopping. Sweden on the other hand, have not.
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Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 1,280 1,133 0,342
Price change (%) 1) -28,8 -43,9 -22,8
Price level 2) 100,0 52,0 43,4
Utility level 452014,0 649226,4 558558,0
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in the simultaneous game =100.
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 1,320 1,176 0,343
Price change (%) 1) -27,6 -42,7 -22,7
Price level  2) 101,7 53,1 43,4
Utility level 452022,8 649227,1 558561,0
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i,e situation in 2004,
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in the simultaneous game =100.
Table 7.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and utility level - simultaneous game
Table 8.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and utility level - sequential game
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 3,137 2,999 1,380
Price change (%)  2) 29,1 5,2 36,9
Price level 3) 181,3 97,5 76,8
Utility level 450839,3 647136,8 557138,4
1) Countries maximize utility disregarding cross-border shopping,
 i.e., as if the economy was closed
2) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
3) Norwegian equilibrium price in the simultaneous game =100
Table 9.  Utility maximizing values -  closed economy 1)
5 Conclusions
By constructing a simulation model we have analyzed commodity tax com-
petition with respect to spirits in the Scandinavian countries. The results
showed that equilibria exists, where the highest tax rate (measured as share
of pre-tax price) and price prevails in Norway, then followed by Sweden and
finally Denmark.
If the governments maximize utility as if cross-border shopping did not
exist, this will lead to significantly higher tax rates on spirits compared to
taking cross-border shopping and its implications into account. The tax
and price structure across the Scandinavian countries can to a large part
be explained by diﬀerent estimates on social costs associated with alcohol
consumption and pre-tax prices. Taking cross-border shopping into account
will increase the price diﬀerential between Norway and Sweden compared
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to both the closed economy and the actual 2004 tax rates. This is inter-
esting because it shows that if attention is given to cross-border shopping,
this could mean that the price diﬀerentials increase between Scandinavian
countries as well as decrease.
Furthermore, when comparing the actual tax rates with the equilibrium
tax rates and the closed economy tax rates, we suggested an interpretation
saying that Norway and Denmark to a larger extent than Sweden, have
started to take cross-border shopping into account. Without further analyses
this interpretation was possible because of the fact that the maximizing tax
rates are rather insensitive with respect to the other countries’ tax rates,
i.e., the tax competition element is not of any large significance. As an
consequence of this our results are rather robust with respect to what kind
of game we assume. Nevertheless, in this model we get the result that the
sequential game equilibrium gives higher tax rates and higher utility for
every country, i.e., the sequential game equilibrium Pareto dominates the
simultaneous game equilibrium.22
Finally, some of the limitations with the approach taken should be men-
tioned. First, close substitutes as wine and beer are a part of the aggregate
good. Modelling these close substitutes could aﬀect our results. Moreover,
letting the tax rate on these also be endogenous could impact the maximizing
tax rate of spirits. Second, our analysis does not take into account distri-
butional and merit goods consideration, which are clearly relevant within
a welfare optimal framework. Third, data on unregistered purchase is, by
nature, associated with a high degree of uncertainty, which in turn could
weaken the results. Fourth, in our analysis we find that the maximizing tax
rates is fairly robust to changes in other countries’ tax rates. This is due to
the fact that the elasticities, which determines the maximizing tax rates, do
not change much. Other ways of modelling could change the picture.
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A Tax revenue maximization
A.1 A necessary conditions for revenue maximizing tax rates
When we maximize the tax revenue associated with spirits, it can be shown
that the first order condition can be written as
tN
pNR
= − 1
ElpNR
SNR
. (36)
Since 0 < tN/pNR < 1 we must have that ElpNRS
N
R < −1. In words: A
necessary condition for the existence of a tax revenue maximizing tax rate
on spirits is that the price elasticity of registered spirit purchase must take on
values greater than one in absolute value, i.e. the demand must be sensitive
enough. Likewise we have for Sweden
tS
pSR
= − 1
ElpSR

SSR + S
N
S
 . (37)
And finally for Denmark
tD
pDR
= − 1
ElpDR

SDR + S
N
D + S
S
D
 . (38)
The only diﬀerence from (36) being that we must include foreigners cross-
border shopping in the formula for Sweden and Denmark, i.e., it is the
change in total taxed demand which matters.
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A.2 Governments’ objective: tax revenue maximization
In this section we presents the results when the governments maximize tax
revenue from spirits. For Norway we have
max
tN
RN (tN , tS , tD) = tNSNR , (39)
where RN is the tax revenue from spirits in Norway which in general depend
on own and other countries’ tax rates on spirits. Likewise, the Sweden
maximizes tax revenue
max
tS
RS(tN , tS , tD) = tS

SSR + S
N
S

. (40)
Note that Norwegian (outward) cross-border shopping, i.e., spirits purchased
in Sweden, is included in the Swedish revenue implying that Sweden gains
tax revenue at the expense of Norway. Finally the objective of the Danish
government is
max
tS
RD(tN , tS , tD) = tD

SDR + S
S
D + S
N
D

(41)
Note that both Swedish and Norwegian cross-border shopping is included in
the tax revenue for Denmark.
The first order condition associated with (34) can be written as
∂RN
∂tN = S
N
R + t
N ∂SNR
∂tN = 0. (42)
Likewise the first order condition for (40) is
∂RS
∂tS = S
S
R + S
N
S + t
S
∂SSR
∂tS +
∂SNS
∂tS

= 0. (43)
And finally the first order condition for (41) is
∂RD
∂tD = S
D
R + S
N
D + S
S
D + t
D
∂SDR
∂tD +
∂SND
∂tD +
∂SSD
∂tD

= 0. (44)
(42) − (43) implicitly define a reaction function for Norway, Sweden and
Denmark respectively, i.e., the maximizing tax rate for a given country as
a function of the other countries’ tax rates. Let these functions be writ-
ten as tN (tS , tD), tS(tN , tD) and tD(tN , tS). Two types of game are then
considered, a simultaneous and a sequential game.
The equilibrium tax rates for a simultaneous game solves the following
equation
∂RN
∂tN =
∂RS
∂tS =
∂RD
∂tD = 0, (45)
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i.e., the equilibrium is defined as the intersection of all the reaction functions.
For the sequential game we will assume that Denmark sets their tax
rate first, then followed by Sweden and finally Norway. We use backward
induction and start with Norway
max
tN
RN(tN , tS , tD), (46)
i.e., Norway maximizes the tax revenue taking the Swedish and Danish tax
rate as given. The solution to this problem gives the reaction function for
Norway, i.e., the maximizing Norwegian tax rate as a function of the Swedish
and Danish tax rates, tN(tS , tD). Sweden maximizes tax revenue subject to
the reaction function of Norway, taking the Danish tax rate as given, hence
max
tS
RS(tN , tS , tD) (47)
s.t. tN(tS , tD).
The solution to this problem implicitly gives us the Swedish maximizing
tax rate as a function of the Danish tax rate set in the first period of the
game, i.e. tS

tD

. Denmark maximizes tax revenue subject to this and the
reaction function for Norway:
max
tD
RD(tN , tS , tD) (48)
s.t. tN

tS , tD

and tS(tD) .
The maximizing Danish tax rate in equilibrium is given by the solution to
this problem, and can be written as:
∂RD
∂tD +
∂RD
∂tN
∂tN
∂tS
∂tS
∂tD +
∂tN
∂tD

+
∂RD
∂tS
∂tS
∂tD

= 0. (49)
A.3 Simulation results
The tax revenue from spirits first increases monotonically when tax rate
on spirits increases, and then, after reaching a maximum point, decreases
monotonically with the tax rate. This is in line with earlier findings. 23
Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 show that there exists an equilibrium under each
type of game, and present the simulation results. Table A.3.1 gives us the
results for the simultaneous game. In the first row we have the equilibrium
tax rates for each country. We see that the equilibrium tax rates is highest in
Norway, then followed by Sweden and Denmark. Compared to the situation
23 In Aasness and Nygård (2009) we simulated Dupuit-curves (better known as Laﬀer-
curves) for diﬀerent cross-border exposed goods in Norway. For some goods this showed
that at first the tax revenue increases monotonically with the tax rate, then, after reaching
a maximum, decreases monotonically with the tax rate.
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in 2004, this implies a price increase on spirits for all countries. The price
increase is by far highest for Norway (30.1%) and Denmark (22.6%), followed
by Sweden (2.2%). The ordering of the elasticities is consistent with the
ordering of the own price elasticity of registered spirits in tables 1, 3 and 5.
A country with a low price sensitivity with respect to registered spirits, gets
the highest tax rate. Note that the equilibrium price diﬀerential between
Norway and the two other countries is higher than in 2004. Especially the
price diﬀerential between Norway and Sweden has increased substantially.
On the other hand, the price diﬀerential between Sweden and Denmark is
lower compared to the situation in 2004.
If we turn to the sequential game in Table A.3.2 we see that the sequen-
tial game consists of higher tax rates and higher tax revenue for all countries,
compared to the simultaneous game. Note that the equilibrium tax rates
change somewhat in the tables, although not much. This suggests that the
maximizing tax rate in each country is rather insensitive with respect to the
two other countries tax rate. This is confirmed by simulations of reaction
curves.
Table A.3.1.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and tax revenue -  
simultaneous game, revenue maximization
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 3,169 2,879 1,131
Price change (%) 1) 30,1 2,1 22,6
Price level  2) 101,1 52,4 38,1
Tax revenue 3263,9 4692,7 1888,6
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in simultaneous game for MITC with utility maximization =100.
Table A.3.2.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and tax revenue -  
sequential game, revenue maximization
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 3,172 2,902 1,140
Price change (%) 1) 30,2 2,7 23,1
Price level  2) 101,2 52,7 38,3
Tax revenue 3266,4 4694,7 1890,5
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in simultaneous game for MITC with utility maximization =100.
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B An alternative model with explicit transporta-
tion costs
B.1 Theoretical framework
Above we thought of the transportational costs as integrated in the utility
function. For instance one liter of spirits purchased in Norway does not
give the same utility for Norwegians as one liter purchased in Sweden. We
can instead model this in a more explicit manner, i.e., we let spirits from
diﬀerent sources be perfect substitutes for each other while we introduce an
explicit cost associated with transportation. For Sweden we then have
max
SSR,S
S
D,S
S
O,C
S
U(SSR + S
S
D + S
S
O, C
S)− α1(SSR + SSD + SSO) (50)
s.t.
pSRS
S
R + p
S
DS
S
D + p
S
OS
S
O + p
S
CC
S = (51)
IS − g(SSD, SSO) + TS
SSRt
S
R + S
S
Ct
S
C − TS = RS −RSCB. (52)
where g(SSD, S
S
O) is the transportation cost function. We have that y
S =
IS−g(SSD, SSO), such that IS is the full income without transportation costs.
Transportation costs is then interpreted as including the costs of leisure.
Substituting TS in (51) gives
IS − g(SSD, SSO)−

qSRS
S
R + p
S
DS
S
D + p
S
OS
S
O + q
S
CC
S

= RS −RSCB. (53)
We let the transportation cost function be quadratic
g(SSD, S
S
O) = ηSD1 SSD + ηSO1 SSO − ηSD2

SSD
2 − ηSO2

SSO
2
. (54)
Maximizing (50) subject to (53) gives the first order conditions
∂U
∂CS = −λq
S
C, (55)
∂U
∂SSR
− α1 = −λqSR, (56)
∂U
∂SSj
− α1 = −λ

pSj + ηSj1 + 2η
Sj
2 S
S
j

(57)
for j = D,O.
Compared to the previous model the only diﬀerence is that in addition to
the retail price comes the transportation costs, changing with the level of
cross-border shopping. And spirits purchased at home is perfect substitutes
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for spirits purchased abroad, implying ∂U/∂SSR = ∂U/∂SSJ for all j. The
Swedish demand for spirits in country j can be written as
SSj =
pSR −

pSj + η
Sj
1

2ηSj2
. (58)
Since Swedes are cross-border shopping in Denmark and ’other countries’,
we must have pSR > p
Sj
j + η
Sj
1 for j = D,O. To avoid a corner solution we
must assume that the total price ( marginal cost of purchasing) of cross-
border shopped spirits increases with the amount of purchase abroad, i.e.,
ηS2 > 0.24
Since we cannot tax cross-border shopping, we will operate within the
second best world.25 We formulate the maximization problem as
max
pNR ,T
N
V S(pS , yS + TS)− αS

SNR + S
S
CB

(59)
s.t.
SSRt
S
R + S
S
Ct
S
C − TS = RS −RSCB, (60)
where SSCB = S
S
D + S
S
O (total outward cross border shopping) and p
S is
a vector containing all prices. Maximizing and rearranging in addition to
using Euler’s theorem and the fact that the cost function is homogenous of
degree one in prices and the cost parameters ηSj1 and η
Sj
2 , give us a formula
that resembles (27)
tSR
pSR
=

tSC
pSC
− α
S
λ
1
pSR

⎡
⎢⎣
ElpSR
eSSR +
SSCB
SSR
ElpSR
eSSCB
ElpNR
eSSR
⎤
⎥⎦+
∂RSCB
∂tSR
∂ eSSR
∂tSR
pSR
, (61)
where
SSCB
SSR
ElpSR
eSSCB = ElpSR
eSSD
SSD
SSR
+ElpSR
eSSO
SSO
SSR
. (62)
The only diﬀerence from (27) is that the expression within brackets
becomes identical.
We use this model to find equilibrium as described in the model with
implicit transportational costs (MITC).
24 It is not obvious what kind of sign the parameter ηNj2 should have. If we think that
the increased cross-border shopping is mainly caused by more and more people finding
it profitable to go cross-border shopping or the same people crossing the border more
frequently, ηNj2 could be thought of as positive. On the other hand, if the increased cross-
border shopping is mainly caused by the same people buying more spirits when they go
abroad, ηN2 could be thought of as negative reflecting economies of scale in purchasing.
25 In fact, to be in first best we must be able to tax total price, i.e., price including the
transportational costs.
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This model diﬀer from the MITC in the way it models costs of purchasing
through cross-border shopping. In the MITC the purchase of registered-
and cross-border shopped spirits is included in the utility function as two
diﬀerent goods acting as substitutes for each other. They generate diﬀerent
utility because of some costs buried in the utility function. This model can be
interpreted to focus on non-pecuniary costs, i.e., physical and psychological
stress associated with cross-border shopping. This stress can reflect the fact
that cross-border shopping involves long drives in combination with crowded
department stores. Moreover, it seems natural that this non-pecuniary cost
increases with both distance to the border and with the number of times
a person is crossing the border. In the literature, this kind of costs have
not got much attention. Nevertheless, it seems that these cost could be
significant.
The model with explicit transportation costs (METC) can be interpreted
to focus on pecuniary costs, such as gasoline expenditures and lost earnings
(cost of leisure). The latter implies a flexible labour market. It is obvious
that these costs are present, but not how significant they are compared to
the non-pecuniary costs for the consumer decision.
Note some demand system properties that is implied by METC, a pri-
ori distinguishing it from MITC. In the alternative model outward cross-
border shopping for country j depends only on the price of spirits (including
transportational costs) in the country where the cross-border shopping takes
place, and the price of registered spirits in country j (ck. equation (58)).
This implies for instance that outward cross-border shopping for Norway in
Sweden does not change when the Danish tax rate changes.26 Furthermore,
it implies that cross-border shopping is independent of income (Engel elas-
ticities equal to zero with respect to cross-border shopping). All this is in
contrast with MITC.
B.2 Specification of preferences
In METC the utility of the representative consumer for Norway, UN , is
specified as a LES, i.e.
UN = BN(SNR + S
N
S + S
N
D + S
N
O − γNa )β
N
a (cN − γNc )β
N
c . (63)
with the same notation as above. This implies that the specification of pref-
erences is identical to the top level of the model with implicit transportation
costs. The only diﬀerence is that the decision on where to purchase spirits
is determined solely of (58). We can illustrate the logic by considering an
increase in tax rate on registered spirits. First the consumer will increase
26This is simply an implication of the fact that the marginal costs of purchasing spirits
abroad in a given country do not change with the amount of cross-border shopping in
other countries
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cross-border shopping until marginal price of purchasing equals domestic
price. Next he will consider changing total spirits consumption. In other
words the decision problem can here be treated as a two stage decision
problem. First determine how much cross-border shopping amount to, then
determine the total demand for spirits and the aggregate good.27
B.3 Calibration procedure
Analogous to MITC it can be shown that we can identify a vector θ of
unknown parameters from characteristics of the demand function at one
point, i.e. it exists a function g
θ = g(p, S, E , C, Y,σT ,d,η2), (64)
where the first six arguments are the same as with MITC, but instead of
knowing a second substitution parameter we now need to know a vector
of cost parameter,η2,and a vector of price diﬀerentials between home and
abroad,d.
Where METC asks for similar parameter input as the MITC, we use
the same parameter values. This implies that σT for each country has the
same value in METC as in MITC, and that the income elasticity is the
same with respect to increase in registered spirit consumption. The cost
parameters are set on the background of a sensitivity analyses with respect
to the disaggregated own price elasticity they generates. Table B.3.1 - B.3.6
show the elasticity matrixes corresponding to table 1-6 for MITC.28 From
table B.3.1, B.3.3 and B.3.5 we see that the METC and the MITC generates
approximately the same disaggregated own price elasticity for spirits in the
base year. Furthermore the cross-price elasticities in the first column are
approximately the same. Since we have a cost parameter associated with
each country we could have let these diﬀer from those in MITC, and still
generating the same own price elasticity for spirits.29
Given all this, it should be apparent what diﬀerences that appears.
Firstly we see that some of the cells have the value of zero, reflecting the
fact that it is no substitution between going cross-border shopping in coun-
try A or country B. This is as mentioned an a priori property of this model.
27 Implicitly we assume that the consumer always wants to purchase some spirits at
home.
28Note that weighted row - and column sums do not always sum to zero. This is a
consequense of the fact that the expenditure function is no longer homogenous of degree
one in prices, but rather in prices and cost parameteres, the latter not included in the
matrix. In addition also the fact that income is no longer treated as a exogenous variable,
but instead varies with the cross-border shopping.
29One of these cross-price elasticities could be large in absolut value and another one
small. It is the sum of substitution to cross-border shopping that matters for the magni-
tude of the disaggregated direct price elasticity for spirits.
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Secondly the own price elasticity of cross-border shopping in country j with
respect to the foreign price in country j, is far less in METC.
Table B.3.2, B.3.4 and B.3.6 diﬀer from the corresponding tables for
MITC because of two reasons. First, when changing the domestic and for-
eign prices we do not change the price of spirits from diﬀerent sources by
the same proportions. If this were the case we had to increase the cost
parameters in addition. Secondly the Engel elasticity diﬀer with respect to
total spirit demand. This is a consequence of the fact that in METC the
Engel elasticity with respect to cross-border shopping is zero a priori, as
mentioned above.30
Note that it applies only locally that the two models generate approxi-
mately the same values for some price- and Engel elasticities. When moving
far away from prices in 2004, i.e., doing a global analysis as here, these val-
ues may diﬀer as well. In light of this it is specially interesting to check how
sensitive the results are to how we model the behavior.
30 Implicitly this means a diﬀerent minimum consumption of total spirits.
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Table B.3.1.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E), budgets shares (w), and tax rates (t/q) for Norway in METC - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chn ej.03casn ej.03cadn ej.03can ej.ogn sum
c03chn Spirits; Norway 0,603 1,572 2,204 -1,184 0,024 0,050 0,010 -0,627 -0,156
c03casn Spirits; cross-border shopping Sweden 0,036 0,000 0,000 1,267 -0,215 0,000 0,000 0,000 1,051
c03cadn Spirits; cross-border shopping Denmark 0,012 0,000 0,000 1,265 0,000 -0,835 0,000 0,000 0,430
c03can Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,066 0,000 0,000 1,274 0,000 0,000 -0,510 0,000 0,764
cogn Other goods and services 99,282 0,998 0,240 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,996 0,001
sum (weighted) 100 % 1 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table B.3.2.  Price elasticities for Norway in METC - main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cn ej.ogn ej.sum
c03cn Spirits -0,794 -0,526 0,001
cogn Other goods and services -0,001 -0,996 0,001
sum (weighted) 0,001 0,000
Table B.3.3.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E) and budgets shares (w) for Sweden in METC - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chs ej.03cads ej.03cas ej.ogs sum
c03chs Spirits; Sweden 0,536 1,41 2,799 -1,317 0,095 0,059 -0,561 -0,309
c03cads Spirits; cross-border shopping Denmark 0,059 0,00 0,000 0,903 -0,235 0,000 0,000 0,668
c03cas Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,220 0,00 0,000 0,879 0,000 -0,536 0,000 0,343
cogs Other goods and services 99,185 1,00 0,250 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,997 0,002
sum (weighted) 100 % 1,00 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,000
Table B.3.4.  Price elasticities for Sweden for METC- main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cs ej.ogs ej.sum
c03cs Spirits -0,560 -0,369 0,002
cogs Other goods and services -0,002 -0,997 0,002
sum (weighted) 0,002 0,000
Table B.3.5.  Price elasticities, Engel elasticities (E) and budgets shares (w) for Denmark in METC - detailed groups
codes Commodity groups W(%) E t/q ej.03chd ej.03cad ej.ogd sum
c03chd Spirits; Denmark 0,414 1,112 0,738 -1,412 0,227 -0,331 -0,404
c03cad Spirits; cross-border shopping other countries 0,116 0,000 0,000 2,261 -0,814 0,000 1,447
cogd Other goods and services 99,470 1,001 0,250 -0,001 0,000 -0,999 0,001
sum (weighted) 100 1 0,000 0,001 0,000
Table B.3.6.  Price elasticities for Danmark in METC- main groups
codes Commodity groups ej.03cd ej.ogd ej.sum
c03cd Spirits -0,609 -0,259 0,001
cogd Other goods and services -0,001 -0,999 0,001
sum (weighted) 0,001 0,000
B.4 Simulation results
Simulations show that the utility first increases monotonically with tax on
spirits, and after reaching a maximum, it decreases monotonically with the
tax rate. The results are given in tables B.4.1 and B.4.2.
Overall the equilibrium tax rates are not very sensitive to wether we use
the MITC or the METC. The largest diﬀerence is the Swedish tax rate, re-
sulting in a price increase on about 4% when moving from MITC to METC.
Nevertheless, the tax rates are somewhat higher in the METC for both
equilibria.
We see that in the sequential game equilibrium the Danish tax rate is
higher along with the Swedish, but the Norwegian tax rate is lower. Further,
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only Denmark gains from a sequential game compared to the simultaneous.
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It may seems strange that the MITC and METC give such similar re-
sults. We are far away from the initial prices, and would expect that the
price elasticities evolves considerably diﬀerent when prices change. In fact,
simulations show that both the own- and cross price elasticities diﬀer sub-
stantially when prices change. But, when considering for instance equation
(27), we see that it is the relative relationship that matters. This relative
relationship does not diﬀer much between the two models.
Table B.4.1.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and utility  - simultaneous game
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 1,350 1,2071 0,3482
Price change (%) 1) -26,7 -41,9 -22,4
Price level 2) 103,0 53,8 43,6
Utility level 452275,6 649017,3 558486,8
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in simultaneous game for MITC =100.
Table B.4.2.  Equilibrium tax rates, prices and utility- sequential game
Norway Sweden Denmark
Tax rate (t/q) 1,341 1,262 0,359
Price change (%) 1) -26,9 -40,5 -21,8
Price level  2) 102,6 55,2 43,9
Utility level 452274,7 649013,6 558489,1
1) Price change compared to initial situation, i.e. situation in 2004.
2) Norwegian equilibrium price in simultaneous game for MITC =100.
31By doing additional simulations of reaction curves we observed that we not always
have strategic complementarity in this case.
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